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An essay on proof, conviction, and explanation: 
Multiple representation systems in combinatorics 
 
There is a longstanding conversation in the mathematics education literature about proofs that 
explain versus proofs that only convince. In this essay, we offer a characterization of explanatory 
proofs with three goals in mind. We first propose a theory of explanatory proofs for mathematics 
education in terms of the representation systems. Then, we illustrate these ideas in terms of 
combinatorial proofs, focusing on binomial identities. Finally, we leverage our theory to explain 
audience-dependent and audience-invariant aspects of explanatory proof. Throughout, we use 
the context of combinatorics to emphasize points and to offer examples of proofs that can be 
explanatory or only convincing, depending on how one understands the claim being made.  
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Introduction and Motivation 
 
Consider the following identity. For all nonnegative integers m ≤ k ≤ n, the binomial 
coefficients satisfy: 
(
𝑛
𝑘
) (
𝑘
𝑚
) = (
𝑛
𝑚
) (
𝑛 − 𝑚
𝑘 − 𝑚
).                                                     (1)  
 
Which of the proofs below do you consider to be explanatory? 
 
 
Figure 1. An enumerative proof of (1). 
 
 
Figure 2. An algebraic proof of (1). 
 
In our experience, many mathematics educators tend to find Proof 1 to be explanatory, while 
few find Proof 2 to be explanatory. In what follows, we provide a theory of proof explanation in 
which either proof can be judged as explanatory, depending upon the motivation and background 
knowledge of the reader. This theory also offers a means to explain why Proof 1 may be more 
likely to be judged as explanatory than Proof 2. 
Our main goal is to provide a theoretical characterization of explanatory proof, particularly 
leveraging examples of proofs in combinatorics to do so. The purpose of this paper is threefold. 
First, we propose a theory of explanatory proofs for mathematics education in terms of the 
representation systems in which proofs are developed, written, and understood. Mathematics 
educators have long contended that there is an important distinction between proofs that explain 
and proofs that only convince (e.g., Hanna, 1990; Hersh, 1993; Pulte, Hanna, & Jahnke, 2009; 
Stylianides, Sandefur, & Watson, 2016; Weber, 2010a). However, the community also 
acknowledges that there is no consensus on what an explanatory proof in mathematics education 
is or should be; indeed, many believe this concept is poorly understood (Bartlo, 2013; Stylianides 
et al., 2016; Raman, 2003). Consequently, a theory of explanatory proof, adequate for the aims 
of mathematics educators, is urgently needed. We provide a candidate for such a theory. Second, 
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we illustrate why the field of combinatorics in general, and the topic of binomial identities in 
particular, provides a fruitful context to study proofs that convince and explain. Third, we seek to 
leverage our theory to explain audience-dependent and audience-invariant aspects of explanatory 
proof. Specifically, we maintain that our theory can elucidate why the explanatory nature (or lack 
thereof) of some proofs will depend both on who is reading the proof and what is to be 
explained, while the explanatory nature of other proofs will be agreed upon by most students and 
mathematicians.  
 
Background Literature and Relevant Theoretical Perspectives 
 
What Is a Proof?  
We draw on a definition of proof (Figure 3) that Stylianides (2007) has developed for 
characterizing proof in school mathematics.  
 
 
Figure 3. Stylianides’ (2007) definition of proof. 
 
We add several clarifications to Stylianides’ (2007) characterization of proof. First, proofs 
form a subset of mathematical arguments; every proof is a mathematical argument but not every 
mathematical argument is a proof. Second, Stylianides’ aim was to define proof in a way that 
respected the role of the classroom community while retaining the mathematical integrity of 
proof (e.g., the modes of argumentation are valid). Here, related to Stylianides’ characterization, 
we interpret a true statement as one the professional mathematical community accepts as true, an 
inferential scheme as valid if that community would find it valid, and a representation as 
appropriate if that community would find it suitable for proof. In this sense, being a proof must 
satisfy constraints apart from any individual or classroom community (Balacheff, 2009). Third, 
when an individual decides if an argument is a proof, she must estimate the community, and 
specifically, the cognition of professional mathematicians. For instance, for a particular inference 
to be allowable in a proof, it is not enough for the individual to accept it; she must also believe it 
to be valid for the community. Hence, deciding whether an argument is a proof involves a social 
judgment. We will later contrast this with deciding whether an argument is convincing or 
explanatory, which we will frame as psychological judgments. Fourth, by proving, we are 
referring to the activity in which an individual is trying to construct an argument that conforms to 
the norms in Stylianides’ characterization. 
 
The Value of Explanatory Proofs 
Mathematics educators have recommended that proof play a central role in mathematics 
classrooms (see Stylianides et al., 2016, for a summary). One line of argument is that a proof 
demonstrates that a theorem is a logically necessary consequence of statements that are accepted 
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as true; accordingly, a proof can provide students with psychological certainty that theorems are 
true (Harel & Sowder, 1998). However, many scholars have argued that a proof can explain why 
a theorem is true to students (deVilliers, 1990; Hanna, 1990; Hersh, 1993; Weber, 2010a), noting 
that proofs often play an explanatory role in professional mathematicians’ practice (e.g., 
deVilliers, 1990; Steiner, 1978).  
To highlight this distinction, researchers have distinguished between proofs that (only) 
convince and proofs that simultaneously convince and explain. We refer to the latter as 
explanatory proofs. Hanna (1990) makes the distinction as follows: a proof that proves “shows 
only that a theorem is true; it provides evidential reasons alone” (p.10), while an explanatory 
proof “also shows why a theorem is true; it provides a set of reasons that derive from the 
phenomenon itself” (p.10). We thus interpret Hanna’s term “proofs that prove” as being 
synonymous with proofs that only convince. Hanna urges mathematics educators to consider the 
pedagogical value of explanatory proofs. Hersh (1993) agrees, arguing that although the primary 
purpose for proofs in mathematical practice is to provide conviction, the primary purpose of 
proof in classrooms should be to provide explanation: “In mathematical research, the purpose of 
proof is to convince. The test of whether something is a proof is whether it convinces qualified 
judges. In the classroom, on the other hand, the purpose of proof is to explain” (p.389). 
Numerous mathematics educators endorse the conclusion that explanatory proofs should play 
an important role in mathematics classrooms (e.g., deVilliers, 1990; Stylianides et al., 2016; 
Weber, 2010a).  
 
What Is an Explanatory Proof in Mathematics Education?  
If we accept that explanatory proofs should play a role in classrooms, then it is important to 
have a good sense of what an explanatory proof is. However, mathematics educators have 
observed that no widely shared operationalization of explanatory proof exists (Bartlo, 2013; 
Raman, 2003; Weber, 2010a). Indeed, we find it telling that in our reading of Pulte et al.’s (2009) 
edited volume on proof and explanation, we found no operationalized definition that would 
distinguish proofs that explain from proofs that merely convince. 
Following Bartlo’s (2013) literature review, we note that mathematics educators’ attempts to 
clarify the meaning of explanatory proofs typically take one of three forms. First, mathematics 
educators have adapted definitions of explanatory proof from the philosophy literature. For 
instance, Steiner (1978) states that a proof is explanatory when it reveals a ‘characteristic 
property,’ where a property is characteristic if the proof would fail if the property was false and 
one could use the same proof technique but substitute another characteristic property to prove a 
new theorem. Hanna (1990) defines explanatory proofs in terms of characteristic properties: 
“Following Steiner (1978), I will say a proof explains when it shows what ‘characteristic 
property’ entails the theorem that it purports to prove” (p.10). However, such definitions evaluate 
the explanatory nature of a proof independently of the student reading the proof (Bartlo, 2013; 
Weber, 2010a). If one accepts the premise that a proof that is explanatory to a mathematician 
might not be explanatory to a student, then objective, audience-independent definitions will be 
incomplete for mathematics educators’ purposes. 
Second, mathematics educators have provided examples of proofs that are (or are not) 
explanatory. Bartlo (2013) summarized the typical examples: 
These often involve showing proofs that involve pictures and stating that the visual proofs 
explain what they are proving, and showing proofs by induction or involving complicated 
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algebra and stating that those proofs only show that a statement is true without offering any 
explanation (Bartlo, 2013, p.34).  
 
For instance, Hanna (1990) offers several proofs for a sum of the first n positive integers. She 
exemplifies a proof that proves with mathematical induction in Figure 4, saying: 
 
Now, this is certainly an acceptable proof: it demonstrates that a mathematical statement is 
true. What it does not do, however, is show why the sum of the first n integers is 
𝑛(𝑛+1)
2
 or 
what characteristic property of the sum of the first n-integers might be responsible for the 
value 
𝑛(𝑛+1)
2
 (Hanna, 1990, p.10). 
Hanna presents the diagrammatic argument in Figure 5 as a proof that explains (although she 
does not specify what characteristic property this proof relies on or what is being explained). 
 
 
Figure 4. A proof that proves (Hanna, 1990). 
 
 
Figure 5. A proof that explains (Hanna, 1990). 
 
These examples help frame debates on explanatory proofs but have not led to consensus on 
what makes a proof explanatory. Inductive proofs are often considered paradigmatic cases of 
proofs that are not explanatory (e.g., Lange, 2009), yet some mathematics educators have argued 
that such proofs can be explanatory (e.g., Harel, 2001; Stylianides, et al., 2016).  
 The third approach for defining explanatory proofs posits that the explanation from a proof 
is rooted in students’ proving activity (Balacheff, 2009; Nunokawa, 2009; Raman, 2003; 
Stylianides, et al., 2016; Weber, 2010a; Weber & Alcock, 2004). A commonality in these 
approaches is that in the process of proving, one may engage in argumentative processes that 
provide insight as to why a theorem is true, but that may be insufficiently rigorous to qualify as a 
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proof. If the proof itself closely resembles the informal reasoning processes used to create it, then 
it qualifies as explanatory. This reminds us of Garuti et al.’s (1998) construct of cognitive unity, 
in which cognitive unity is achieved whenever an individual’s process used to form or evaluate a 
conjecture is related to the proof they constructed to establish the conjecture. If cognitive unity is 
achieved, the (possibly non-rigorous) insights that explain why a theorem is true are present to 
the individual in the proof that she produces, so the proof is viewed as explanatory to the 
individual. While this approach is useful for illuminating how explanation and proof may co-
evolve in the proving process (Nunokawa, 2009), it is limited in the following respect: If 
explanation is by definition rooted in proving activity (Balacheff, 2009; Nunokawa, 2009), then 
it would seem that all proofs, if properly understood, are explanations. Balacheff (2009) 
explicitly endorses this position. However, this is in contrast with the claims of Hanna (1990) 
and Hersh (1993) that some proofs are not explanatory and thus undesirable to use in lectures. 
We also agree with Bartlo (2013) that it seems possible for a proof to be explanatory to an 
individual without the individual linking the proof to some other activity or argument. For 
instance, we believe most combinatorialists would find Proof 1 to be explanatory when they read 
it, without reflecting on how the proof might have been generated. 
We agree with Bartlo (2013) that each of the three approaches above did not provide
1
 an 
adequate characterization of explanatory proof for mathematics educators’ purposes, but we also 
believe that they provide some insights into the nature of explanatory proof for which an 
adequate theory should account. To summarize: 
 Whether a proof is explanatory should, in some cases, depend upon who is reading 
the proof. 
 Nonetheless, there is some uniformity in mathematics educators’ judgments on 
whether some proofs are explanatory.  
 Proofs that explicitly rely on visual reasoning are frequently judged as explanatory. 
 Purely algebraic demonstrations are often not considered explanatory, although they 
can sometimes be explanatory to some audiences. 
 Individuals’ engagement in the proving process, especially if they can relate the 
process used to understand why a theorem is true to the resulting proof, is important 
for determining whether a proof is explanatory.  
We now present a theory that we contend accounts for each of these phenomena. 
 
Characterizing Proof, Conviction, and Explanation 
in Terms of Representation Systems 
 
Representation Systems 
Recall that in Stylianides’ characterization of proof, an argument must be presented in a 
mode of representation that is acceptable to the appropriate community (professional or 
classroom). We extend this idea of representation systems and, in subsequent sections, use them 
to define which arguments will be convincing and explanatory. 
Following Weber and Alcock (2009) and consistent with Balacheff (2009), we define a 
representation system (RS) as a structure with permissible configurations and inferential 
schemes. Permissible configurations are organizations of inscriptions (words, symbols, lines) 
that represent mathematical objects and relationships between these objects. Permissible 
                                                 
1
 Providing such a definition was not necessarily their intent. 
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configurations include equations, graphs, and some English sentences.  Inferential schemes allow 
the user to infer new mathematical statements from other mathematical statements (where 
statements are represented as permissible configurations). A personal inferential scheme is an 
individual’s (possibly pragmatic and defeasible) means to infer new statements from permissible 
configurations. A truth-preserving inferential scheme is an inferential scheme that the individual 
believes will always yield true statements from true premises. A valid inferential scheme is an 
inferential scheme that is regarded by the mathematical community as truth-preserving and 
acceptable within a proof. 
To illustrate, consider the combinatorial notion of “n choose k,” denoted (
𝑛
𝑘
). This notion can 
be reasoned about in many different RSs, and we exemplify just two in this section (we elaborate 
a third in Proof C below). First, we consider an enumerative RS, the RS in which Proof 1 in the 
beginning of this paper is couched. Here “n choose k” is represented by natural language 
sentences describing real-life situations in which one chooses k objects from a set of n objects, 
such as when choosing committees (these words and sentences are the respective characters and 
permissible configurations of the system). A crucial valid inferential scheme for this RS is that if 
two different combinatorial expressions can be represented as different ways of counting the 
same set of objects, then the two combinatorial expressions are equal. Other valid inferential 
schemes may draw on ideas like the multiplication principle or equivalence.  
We can also consider an algebraic RS in which Proof 2 is couched. Here, “n choose k” can be 
represented by the expression 
𝑛!
(𝑛−𝑘)!𝑘!
, where characters involve symbols and variables, and 
permissible configurations include algebraic expressions and equations. A crucial valid 
inferential scheme for this RS is the transitive property for equality of real numbers. Other valid 
inferential schemes include general algebraic techniques and properties of factorials.  
The RS in which an individual chooses to reason may have a significant impact on the types 
of arguments she can construct. Arguments within one RS may be difficult to replicate in another 
RS. For instance, we do not see how one could couch Proof 1 in an algebraic RS or Proof 2 in an 
enumerative RS. However, even if there is a correspondence between two RSs, an inference 
within one RS may take less cognitive effort than the analogous inference in the other. To 
illustrate, consider Figure 6 (taken from Sfard, 1991), which represents the same mathematical 
concept in two different ways. Now imagine trying to justify that the shortest stroll between 12 
and 4 is four steps. It seems clear that producing a justification in the second graphical RS is less 
cognitively demanding than in the first, and will likely be easier to understand. 
We refer to personal inferences that are easy for an individual to produce and understand 
because of her familiarity with an RS as natural inferences. We make three important 
clarifications. First, what inferences are natural depends on the individual. In Figure 6, viewing 
North(x) as moving up a node is intuitive based on our experience reading maps and reasoning 
about diagrams. For someone without such experience, the visual RS in Figure 6 might not 
permit natural inferences. Second, with sufficient experience within an RS, some inferences may 
become natural to an expert, even if they seem mysterious to a layperson. For instance, those 
with substantial experience in high school algebra will find it natural to simplify expressions by 
cancelling like expressions from the numerator and denominator, even though some learners 
might find such simplifications challenging. Third, natural inferences are not necessarily truth-
preserving or valid. For instance, concluding that a function is increasing because its graph goes 
up as it is read from left to right is both defeasible and generally not permissible in a proof (e.g., 
Weber & Mejía-Ramos, 2019). 
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Figure 6. Sfard’s (1991) representations of Promenades and Strolls. 
 
To keep our discussion manageable, we will focus on students reasoning in RSs in which 
there is a shared understanding between the student and the community as to which inferential 
schemes are permissible. This is an oversimplification in two respects. First, students often are 
reasoning in RSs where they do not understand the difference between personal and valid 
inferential schemes (Balacheff, 2009), so with regard to explanatory proofs, we are speaking to 
relatively mature students. Second, even in professional mathematical communities, there is 
often ambiguity as to which inferential schemes are valid or require further justification. 
Generalizing our framework beyond our simplified scope is an interesting project for future 
research. 
 
Convincing Arguments and Their Relationship to Proof 
We consider a mathematical argument to be convincing to an individual when it has the 
following characteristics: (i) it begins with axioms, definitions, or statements the individual 
believes are true, (ii) it employs personal inferential schemes the individual believes are truth-
preserving, and (iii) it is couched within, or can be mapped to, an RS the individual finds 
personally meaningful. By personally meaningful, we mean the individual understands how the 
permissible configurations in the RS represent the relationship between the mathematical ideas 
under consideration.  
To us, the biggest difference between evaluating whether an argument is convincing or 
qualifies as a proof is that the former is a personal psychological judgment while the latter is 
inherently a social judgment. In our view, evaluating whether an argument is a proof requires 
one to consider whether the argument is appropriate to the community. There is no such 
requirement in our characterization of whether an argument is convincing.  
With regard to (i), Stylianides’ (2007) description requires proof begin with arguments that 
are accepted statements by a community. We presume if a statement is not an axiom or 
 9 
definition, the statement would need to have been proven to be accepted. For a convincing 
argument, the bar is lower. The individual need only believe the statement is true, even if her 
community has not yet accepted it. For instance, imagine a mathematician who believes that the 
Riemann Hypothesis is true (as many mathematicians do). She may find an argument showing 
that statement S that is implied by the Riemann Hypothesis to be a convincing argument for S 
despite being aware that this is not a proof of S, since the Riemann Hypothesis is not a theorem.  
With regard to (ii), an individual may believe some inferential schemes are truth-preserving 
even if she is aware that they are beyond the reach of her classroom community or that the 
mathematical community would not regard them as valid. For instance, students may gain 
conviction by generalizing from examples even if they are aware this is impermissible in a proof 
(e.g., Brown, 2014).  
With regard to (iii), an individual may consider an RS as personally meaningful even if she is 
aware that the mathematical community regards it as inappropriate for proof. For instance, in his 
Proofs Without Words, Nelsen (1993) indicates he finds picture arguments to be convincing but 
does not think they qualify as proofs. Similarly, Weber (2010b) describes a student who finds a 
graphical justification to be “completely convincing” but nonetheless not to qualify as a proof. 
The student’s rationale is: “they don’t really allow us to use graphs. And this, I’m basing this 
whole proof off of a graph which is not, I would say, professional… So, that’s what I’ve been 
learning in class. We’re not allowed to draw any pictures.” (p.323). Here a student distinguishes 
between RSs in which the inferential schemes are personally convincing to him and those which 
he believes are valid. Finally, while the examples above illustrate how individuals may find an 
argument convincing while not being a proof, it can also be the case that there are proofs that are 
not convincing. This can occur, for instance, if there is an inferential scheme that an individual 
knows the mathematical community accepts as valid but about which the individual has personal 
doubts. This can occur with students if an argument is couched in an RS that the student does not 
really understand. This likely occurs rarely in mathematical practice; but this may occur with 
students, such as when they accept proofs as valid yet nonetheless find them unpersuasive. 
   
Explanatory Arguments and Their Relationship to Conviction and Proof 
We define a mathematical argument as explanatory to an individual with respect to an RS 
when it has the following characteristics: (i) it begins with axioms, definitions, or statements the 
individual believes are true, (ii) it employs inferential schemes that are natural, and (iii) it is 
couched within, or can be mapped to, an RS the individual finds personally valuable.  
By personally valuable, we mean a personally meaningful RS that an individual additionally 
feels would be interesting or appropriate to couch a proof. Individuals’ reasons for personally 
valuing an RS may be idiosyncratic, but we offer two general factors that students or 
mathematicians may consider. First, some mathematicians prefer RSs that place a proof in its 
“proper context,” meaning that the RS relates to the primary meanings of the concepts involved 
in the proven statement (Paseau, 2010). For instance, if an individual thought that (
𝑛
𝑘
) really was 
about choosing k-element subsets from an n element set, and felt that the formula 
𝑛!
(𝑛−𝑘)!𝑘!
 was a 
secondary expression that just happens to algebraically capture the number of ways to choose 
these subsets, she would likely value the enumerative RS of Proof 1. Alternatively, an individual 
who felt that (
𝑛
𝑘
) really was an abbreviation for 
𝑛!
(𝑛−𝑘)!𝑘!
,  and felt that choosing k-element subsets 
from an n element sets was an interesting interpretation or application of the expression 
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abbreviated by (
𝑛
𝑘
), would likely value the algebraic RS of Proof 2. As Paseau (2010) notes, 
mathematicians may disagree on the ‘proper context’ for a proof. Second, an RS may be 
personally valued by an individual if it aligns with that individuals’ preferred reasoning style. 
For instance, an individual who prefers to reason visually will tend to value RSs that represent 
concepts diagrammatically and allow for perceptual inferences.  
As with the relationship between conviction and proof, we again observe that in our framing 
not every explanation is a proof and not every proof is explanatory. The differences between 
proof and explanation parallel the differences between proof and conviction laid out earlier –
evaluating an argument as a proof involves a social judgment and evaluating an argument as 
explanatory is a psychological judgment. For instance, many individuals such as Nelsen (1993) 
find some of Nelsen’s “proofs without words” to be explanatory (because they rely on natural 
inferences) but not to qualify as bona fide proofs (because they occur in an inappropriate RS)
2
.  
In the mathematics education literature, there is a focus on explanatory proofs—that is, 
arguments that are both explanatory and proofs. For the remainder of this paper, we will focus on 
explanatory proofs, contrasting them with convincing proofs that are not explanatory. We 
highlight four consequences from our definition of explanatory arguments.  
We first contend that explanatory proofs will generally be convincing as well. Criterion (i) 
for conviction and explanation are identical. With regard to (ii), in our conception, a truth-
preserving inference need not be natural to an individual. An individual can verify a cumbersome 
calculation without finding it to be natural (i.e., the calculation may require substantial cognitive 
effort). Alternatively, as previously noted, a natural inference need not be truth-preserving. 
However, in general, if an individual finds an inference to be natural within an RS she 
understands and finds valuable (criteria (ii) and (iii) for explanation) and she believes that 
mathematicians would find the inference to be valid (a criterion for proof), the individual will 
typically find the inference to be truth-preserving (criterion (ii) for conviction). Finally, criterion 
(iii) for explanation implies criterion (iii) for conviction. That is, if an RS is personally valuable, 
it will be personally meaningful. 
Second, this definition views explanations as explaining how rather than why. This is 
consistent with the way mathematicians use the word “explain” in their writing. Based on a 
corpus analysis of a large number of mathematical articles, Mejia-Ramos and Inglis (2017) found 
that mathematicians were far more likely to use the phrase “explain how” in their text than 
“explain why.” Note that by emphasizing explaining how we are not suggesting that an 
explanatory proof merely explains how to carry out steps in a procedure; justification is central 
to our understanding of an explanatory proof, and we propose that an explanatory proof outlines 
a method for how a statement might be justified. That is, by explaining how a statement can be 
justified, the proof makes explicit why that statement is true. 
Third, proofs are not globally explanatory, but explanatory with respect to a given RS. What 
is being explained is how to justify a claim within a desirable RS or with a particular type of 
reasoning. For instance, Proof 1 explains how to prove an identity enumeratively, and Proof 2 
explains how to prove it algebraically. We explore this further in the subsequent section. 
                                                 
2
 Balacheff (2009) also defined explanation as a psychological construct, proof as a social construct, and both 
characterized in terms of representation systems. However, at least in terms of student-generated proofs, he viewed a 
proof as a socially accepted explanation (i.e., all proofs are explanations). Our characterization says a student-
generated proof might not be explanatory if it was generated with non-natural inferences or in an RS that a student 
did not personally value. 
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Fourth, this definition is clearly student-centered. With respect to (ii), recall we defined 
natural inferences as inferences that are easy for an individual to produce and understand because 
of her familiarity with an RS. Whether an inferential scheme is natural is partially dependent 
upon the individual’s experience working within that RS. Further, with respect to (iii), the types 
of RSs that are considered valuable can vary between individuals. Thus, we reiterate that RSs 
(and therefore the extent to which a certain proof might be considered explanatory) are closely 
related to an individual’s prior knowledge and background experience.  
 
Clarifying Aspects of Explanatory Proof through a Discussion of Mathematical Examples 
in a Combinatorial Context 
 
Insights from Proofs of Binomial Identities 
To elaborate our definitions of RSs and explanatory proof, we consider examples from 
combinatorics involving binomial identities. In our experience, this topic naturally lends itself to 
moving between RSs. Indeed, as we will describe, it is commonplace to use a secondary RS 
(perhaps enumerative) to prove a relationship in a given RS (perhaps algebraic). To appreciate 
the upcoming discussion, take a moment to consider the following identity. For all integers 0 ≤ k 
≤ n, the binomial coefficients satisfy: 
 
(
𝑛
𝑘
) =  (
𝑛
𝑛 − 𝑘
).                                                           (2) 
 
When you see equation (2), how do you interpret the claim being made? Is it a claim about 
two coefficients in a polynomial? Is it an assertion about two types of subsets of an n-element 
set? Is it describing a property of a recursively defined triangular array (Pascal’s triangle)? Is it 
saying several of these? Something else? Depending on how you answer this question, you may 
have different expectations of what constitutes a “proof that explains,” and you may find 
different proofs more or less explanatory, or even more or less convincing.  
In this section we provide proofs of claim (2) in three different representation systems. We 
offer proofs in RSs that emphasize enumeration (Proof A), rules of algebra (Proof B), and the 
binomial theorem (Proof C), acknowledging that we could also explore additional RSs of this 
same expression (such as induction, block-walking, Taylor’s theorem, etc.).  
Proof A: An explanatory proof in an enumerative RS. In an enumerative proof, we argue 
that the two sides of the identity represent two different counting processes (e.g., Lockwood, 
2013) that either a) count the same set of outcomes (a direct combinatorial proof) or b) count two 
different sets of outcomes between which there is a bijection (a bijective combinatorial proof). 
Valid inferential schemes include enumerative arguments that draw on fundamental 
combinatorial principles and the fact that sets have a unique cardinality. For simplicity, we 
provide one example of a direct combinatorial proof.  
We show that both sides of the identity count the following set: the set of k-member 
committees of a group of n people. That is, we interpret equation (2) as a statement that relates 
different expressions counting subsets of n-element sets. The left-hand side counts the number of 
k-member committees by selecting k members from the n people that should be included in the 
committee. The right-hand side counts the number of k-member committees by enumerating their 
complements – by selecting the n–k group members from n people who will not serve on the 
committee. Because both sides of the identity count the same quantity (the number of k-member 
committees), the expressions must be numerically equal. This proof explains how we justify the 
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combinatorial identity in terms of counting subsets; in this way, we gain insight into why the 
statement is true. 
Proof B: An explanatory proof in an algebraic RS. We can accept the enumerative 
justification above as being both convincing and a proof, yet we can still wonder about how the 
combinatorial identity can be justified algebraically. In an algebraic RS, equation (2) can be 
interpreted as a statement about factorial expressions involving (nonnegative) integers, and valid 
rules of inference include properties of integers and algebraic rules.  
Substituting the algebraic interpretation of binomial coefficients (
𝑛
𝑘
) =
𝑛!
(𝑛−𝑘)!𝑘!
  into (2) and 
applying rules of algebra yields the following proof:  
(
𝑛
𝑘
) =  
𝑛!
(𝑛−𝑘)!𝑘!
=
𝑛!
𝑘!(𝑛−𝑘)!
=
𝑛!
(𝑛−(𝑛−𝑘))!(𝑛−𝑘)!
= (
𝑛
𝑛 − 𝑘
). 
Since we can use rules of algebra to manipulate and transform one expression into the other, both 
sides of (2) are algebraically equivalent, and the statement follows. This algebraic proof explains 
something different than the enumerative proof – how we justify the identity in terms of 
algebraic rules and inferences. By detailing how the identity can be justified algebraically, it 
proves directly why the algebraic claim is true. These first two proofs, A and B, are similar to 
the examples of Proofs 1 and 2 from the introduction. 
Proof C: An explanatory proof in a binomial theorem RS. In another RS, we could 
perceive binomial coefficients (
𝑛
𝑘
) in terms of their role in the binomial theorem. The theorem 
states
3
 that for all nonnegative integers a, b, and n,  
(𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑛 =  ∑ (
𝑛
𝑘
) 𝑎𝑘𝑏𝑛−𝑘 .𝑛𝑘=0                                                (3) 
Thus the interpretation of (
𝑛
𝑘
) is as the coefficient of the term 𝑎𝑘𝑏𝑛−𝑘 in the expansion of the 
expression (𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑛. In this RS, valid rules of inference involve rules of algebraic expansion and 
the equality of corresponding coefficients. 
To justify (2) in this sense, we consider the following: 
 
 
 
Again, this proof explains how (2) can be derived within the context of the binomial theorem, 
and in doing so, it makes explicit why the binomial coefficients in (2) must be equal. Like Proof 
B, this proof also relies on algebra, but the proofs are different in the ways they appeal to specific 
rules of inference appropriate to the respective RSs. Here the initial step involves interpreting the 
two sides of (2) not as an algebraic expression of 
𝑛!
(𝑛−𝑘)!𝑘!
, but rather as specific coefficients of 
two binomial expansions. 
 
Reflections on the Algebraic and Enumerative Proofs – What Is Being Explained?  
                                                 
3
 The theorem extends to other, non-integer values, but we focus on this version. 
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We take these three proofs as reference points for continuing our discussion of proofs that 
explain and proofs that only convince. A common way to view these proofs would be to say that 
the algebraic Proof B only convinces, while the enumerative Proof A is somehow more 
explanatory (and perhaps Proof C is somewhere in between). One could argue that the 
enumerative proof involves some evocative real-world activity (choosing committees) while the 
algebraic proof involves merely symbol-pushing. We understand the appeal of this perspective, 
and as combinatorialists we find the enumerative proofs to be particularly satisfying. However, 
we argue that there is a deeper story to tell, and each of the above proofs can be considered to be 
explanatory and/or convincing depending on which RS a certain individual might adopt. 
We contend that the question What is the proof explaining? is not a simple inquiry, but it is 
made somewhat clearer when viewed in the context of RSs. For example, we would argue that 
the enumerative Proof A is explanatory in the enumerative RS because it demonstrates how (2) 
can be justified in terms of counting subsets (in particular, committees). However, this 
enumerative proof is not explanatory in an algebraic RS or in an RS focused on the binomial 
theorem. That is, even if one fully understands the enumerative Proof A, there still remains the 
mystery of why the result follows if we interpret (
𝑛
𝑘
) as 
𝑛!
(𝑛−𝑘)!𝑘!
  or as a coefficient of a binomial 
expansion. Conversely, the algebraic Proof B does not provide explanation for how the identity 
might be justified in an enumerative domain; however, Proof B is explanatory in the RS of 
algebra, interpreting (
𝑛
𝑘
) as a particular quotient of factorial expressions. 
In short, what constitutes an explanation is relative to the RS used to interpret the claim being 
made. How does this relate to convincing? We contend that a proof of a claim in a given RS may 
be convincing to an individual but not explanatory for them, particularly if they interpret the 
claim using another RS. In our examples of multiple proofs of the identity (2), we suggest that 
the algebraic proof may be convincing to an individual who reads (2) as a claim in the 
enumerative RS, even if it is not explanatory to them (it does not explain the enumeration). This 
is especially true if the individual acknowledges the validity of the identity (
𝑛
𝑘
) =  
𝑛!
(𝑛−𝑘)!𝑘!
 , 
which can function as a translation device between the enumerative and algebraic RSs. Similarly, 
the enumerative proof may convince someone that the algebraic claim must be true, even if the 
enumerative proof offers no insight into what specific algebraic steps could be used to verify this 
fact in an algebraic RS.  
We commonly use such relationships between RSs to prove results in combinatorics. To 
emphasize this point, consider the following identity 
∑ (
𝑛
𝑘
) = 2𝑛𝑛𝑘=0 .                                                             (4) 
This identity is quite natural to prove enumeratively. Both sides count the total number of subsets 
of any size from a set of n elements. The left-hand side counts this by summing the numbers of 
k-element subsets for all possible values of k from 0 to n. The right-hand side counts this by 
considering, for each of the n elements in the set, whether or not to include it as an element of a 
subset. Identity (4) is also straightforward to prove using the binomial theorem, substituting the 
value 1 for both a and b in (3). However, it is not immediately apparent why the corresponding 
algebraic fact about sums of quotients of factorial expressions should hold (just try it). Here, 
then, an enumerative proof may convince us of the ultimate correctness of the algebraic claim, 
and it may give us confidence that an algebraic derivation exists, but it does not itself explicitly 
reveal or fully explain the conjectured algebraic claim. In other words, if all we needed was to be 
convinced that this identity holds, it would suffice to use an enumerative argument or the 
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binomial theorem to prove the result, rather than an algebraic argument. But if we sought to 
understand why such a miraculous algebraic claim holds algebraically, we might remain just as 
mystified after these proofs as we were before. 
More commonly in combinatorics research, we proceed in the other direction – using algebra 
to convince us of identities that are difficult to prove enumeratively. For example, generating 
functions offer a well-established technique of translating combinatorial questions into algebraic 
settings, using algebra to derive results, then translating back into the combinatorial context. A 
proof by generating functions is explanatory in an algebraic RS, demonstrating clearly how 
algebraic manipulations establish the relationship, but it does not necessarily explain how the 
relationship may be justified enumeratively.  
The fact that there are different RSs in which proofs may convince or explain is a wonderful 
aspect of mathematics, affording opportunities to develop convincing proofs even if the 
derivation of a claim in a preferred RS is particularly difficult. Our point, then, is that it is overly 
simplistic to characterize a proof as being objectively convincing or explanatory without further 
specifying what precisely is being explained and to whom, and in particular, in what RS the 
statement to prove is being interpreted. 
 
Relation to Previous Insights about Explanatory Proof 
Earlier, we summarized five insights about explanatory proofs from the mathematics 
education literature for which a good characterization of explanatory proof should account. Here 
we argue that our characterization meets these challenges. 
Explanatory proofs should be individual-dependent. Whether a proof is explanatory to an 
individual depends critically on which RSs that individual understands and personally values. As 
different students have different experiences, interests, and reasoning preferences, their 
relationship to specific RSs will also be different. A student’s tendency to value algebra over 
enumeration may stem from an overall comfort level with algebra and a feeling of inadequacy or 
inexperience in being able to solve counting problems (indeed, student difficulties with 
combinatorics are well documented, e.g., Batanero, et al., 1997). For such students, it is 
understandable that they would value algebra over counting, as an algebraic RS would likely 
allow them to feel more comfortable and confident in their proof. Similarly, a mathematician 
may value an enumerative proof because it offers insight about an enumeration technique that 
they value, even if they are just as comfortable and confident about algebra.  
There is some uniformity about which proofs are explanatory. In the next two 
paragraphs, we describe two areas of such uniformity, the tendency of visual arguments to be 
explanatory and the reasons why complicated algebraic arguments tend not to be. 
Proofs that rely on visual reasoning tend to be explanatory. As Bartlo (2013) observes, 
mathematics educators tend to offer visual proofs as explanatory proofs. These proofs usually 
involve inferential schemes based on our intuitions about two-dimensional Euclidean space (e.g., 
Weber & Mejia-Ramos, 2019) or on geometry facts learned at a young age. For instance, 
Hanna’s (1990) explanatory proof in Figure 2 relies on basic geometric intuition and facts. For 
most students with extensive mathematical training, the geometric RS in which Hanna is 
working will be understood well and the inferential schemes relying on two-dimensional 
Euclidean space will be natural. This is one reason why justifications couched within a visual RS 
tend to be viewed as explanatory.  
Proofs that rely on complex algebraic manipulations tend not to be explanatory. Bartlo 
(2013) further observes that the most frequent exemplars of non-explanatory proofs rely on 
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complicated algebra. We suggest that the fact that the algebraic manipulations are complicated 
implies that the algebraic inferences being made are framed as requiring substantial cognitive 
effort and not being natural. Standard template-based proofs by induction (c.f. Harel, 2001), such 
as the proof in Figure 4 that Hanna (1990) highlights as non-explanatory, offer an interesting 
special case of this. Many of the algebraic inferences are truth preserving upon reflection, but 
they are not natural inferences that can easily be seen by dint of the algebraic RS. Further, the 
overarching structure of the inductive step involves deducing S(k+1) = 
(𝑛+1)(𝑛+2)
2
 from the 
inductive hypothesis. Again, an individual who understood proof by induction could verify that 
this (along with the base case) was sufficient to prove the theorem, but this is not obvious on the 
surface, and is often not how we think about “what the theorem statement is really about”. For 
instance, unlike Hanna’s (1990) explanatory proof presented in Figure 5, the proof does not 
represent the summation of n numbers as the accumulation of n quantities. (However, Harel 
(2001) and Stylianides et al. (2016) suggest that proofs by induction can be explanatory if they 
are manifestations of students’ natural recursive reasoning). In addition, it may be the case that 
complex algebraic proofs do not typically explain what an individual wants to be explained. That 
is, as in the case of combinatorial identities, often algebraic expressions serve as a proxy for 
different mathematical phenomena or objects that an individual values, and the algebra in and of 
itself is not what an individual seeks to justify or explain about a statement. 
Students are more likely to find their own proofs, which are the result of their own 
proving process, to be explanatory. As Stylianides et al. (2016) and Nunokawa (2009) observe, 
under some conditions, students are likely to view a proof in which the students’ final proof 
product is based on their initial exploration to be explanatory. We believe this insight is a 
consequence of our characterization of explanation. Students will tend to explore the veracity of 
conjectures in RSs that they understand well and personally value. Hence, when students decide 
that a conjecture is true, they do so based on an explanatory argument that they generated. If a 
cognitive unity (Garuti et al., 1998) between this argument in their proof is achieved, then the 
individual will perceive a mapping between their explanatory argument and the proof that they 
produced. This satisfies our condition for a proof to be explanatory.  
 
Conclusion  
Our goals in this paper were threefold: to propose a theory of explanatory proofs for 
mathematics education, framed in terms of the representation systems in which proofs are 
developed, written, and understood; to use combinatorics as a domain in which to illustrate our 
proposed theory; and to leverage our theory to explain audience-dependent and audience-
invariant aspects of explanatory proof. Wanting to move beyond simply labeling proofs as 
explanatory, we hope to have contributed to a more nuanced perspective on proofs that explain.  
The notion of RSs in proof allows us to reframe how we think about students’ proving 
activity. The idea that students may work from different RSs gives a lens through which to 
consider student activity in proof-based classes, perhaps giving students more credit than simply 
dismissing their activity as meaningless and purely syntactic. For example, when a student tends 
toward algebra when trying to prove a binomial identity, it is easy to assume they are engaging 
superficially, not sufficiently attempting to understand the situation conceptually. But such a 
student may be viewing the statement to be proven through an algebraic RS, which may 
represent the primary meaning of the claim to them. By clarifying how arguments might be 
construed as explanatory or convincing to an individual (and by suggesting that arguments may 
be explanatory in a variety of different ways), we allow for potentially broader views of how 
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individuals make sense of and use mathematical concepts, ideas, or perspectives. Thus, this 
perspective on proofs that explain may give agency to the prover.  
 
  
 17 
Acknowledgments 
 
We thank the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. 
 
 18 
References 
 
Batanero, C., Navarro-Pelayo, V., & Godino, J. (1997). Effect of the implicit combinatorial 
model on combinatorial reasoning in secondary school pupils. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics, 32, 181-199. 
Balacheff, N. (2009). Bridging knowing and proving in mathematics: A didactical perspective. In 
Pulte, H., Hanna, G., & Jahnke, H. J. (Eds.). (2009). Explanation and proof in 
mathematics: philosophical and educational perspectives. New York: Springer. 
Bartlo, J. R. (2013). Why ask why: an exploration of the role of proof in the mathematics 
classroom. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Portland State University. Portland, OR. 
Brown, S. A. (2014). On skepticism and its role in the development of proof in the 
classroom. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 86(3), 311-335. 
De Villiers, M. (1999). The role and function of proof. In M. de Villiers (Ed.), Rethinking proof 
with the Geometer’s Sketchpad (pp. 3-10). Key Curriculum Press. 
Fischbein, E. (1987). Intuition in science and mathematics: an educational approach (Vol. 5). 
Springer: Dordrecht. 
Garuti, R., Boero, P., & Lemut, E. (1998). Cognitive unity of theorems and difficulty of proof. In 
A. Olivier & K. Newstead (Eds.), Proceedings of the 22nd Conference of the 
International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education (Vol. 2, pp. 345-352). 
Stellenbosch, South Africa. 
Hanna, G. (1990). Some pedagogical aspects of proof. Interchange, 21(1), 6-13. 
Harel, G., & Sowder, L. (1998). Students' proof schemes. In E. Dubinsky, A. Schoenfeld, & J. 
Kaput (Eds.), Research on Collegiate Mathematics Education (Vol. III) (pp. 234—283).  
Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society.  
Harel, G. (2001). The development of mathematical induction as a proof scheme: A Model for 
DNR-based instruction. In S. Campbell & R. Zaskis (Eds.), Learning and teaching 
number theory (pp. 185—212). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.  
Hersh, R. (1993). Proving is convincing and explaining. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 
24(4), 389–399. 
Lange, M. (2009). Why proofs by mathematical induction are generally not explanatory. 
Analysis, 69(2), 203-211. 
Lockwood, E. (2013). A model of students’ combinatorial thinking. Journal of Mathematical 
Behavior, 32, 251-265. doi:10.1016/j.jmathb.2013.02.008 
Mejia-Ramos, J.P. & Inglis, M. (2017). ‘Explanatory’ talk in mathematics research papers. In 
(Eds.) A. Weinberg, C. Rasmussen, J. Rabin, M. Wawro, and S. Brown Proceedings of 
the 20
th
 Conference for Research in Undergraduate Mathematics Education (pp. 373-
382). San Diego, California. 
Nelsen, R. (1993). Proofs without words: exercises in visual thinking. Washington, DC: MAA. 
Nunokawa, K. (2009). Proof, mathematical problem-solving, and explanation in mathematical 
teaching. In Pulte, H., Hanna, G., & Jahnke, H. J. (Eds.). (2009). Explanation and proof 
in mathematics: philosophical and educational perspectives. New York: Springer. 
Paseau, A. (2010). Proofs of the compactness theorem. History and Philosophy of Logic, 31(1), 
73-98. 
Pulte, H., Hanna, G., & Jahnke, H. J. (Eds.). (2009). Explanation and proof in mathematics: 
philosophical and educational perspectives. New York: Springer. 
 19 
Raman, M. (2003). Key ideas: What are they and how can they help us understand how people 
view proof? Educational Studies in Mathematics, 52(3), 319-325.  
Sfard, A. (1991). On the dual nature of mathematical conceptions: Reflections on processes and 
objects as different sides of the same coin. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 22, 1–36.  
Steiner, M. (1978). Mathematical explanation. Philosophical Studies, 34, 135-151. 
Stylianides, A. J. (2007). Proof and proving in school mathematics. Journal for Research in 
Mathematics Education, 38(3), 289-321. 
Stylianides, G. J., Sandefur, J., & Watson, A. (2016). Conditions for proving by mathematical 
induction to be explanatory. Journal of Mathematical Behavior, 43, 20-34.  
Weber, K. (2010a). Proofs that develop insight: proofs that reconceive mathematical domains 
and proofs that introduce new methods. For the Learning of Mathematics, 30(1), 32-37. 
Weber, K. (2010b). Mathematics majors’ perceptions of conviction, validity, and 
proof. Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 12, 306-336. 
Weber, K. & Alcock, L. (2004). Semantic and syntactic proof productions. Educational Studies 
in Mathematics, 56, 209-234. 
Weber, K. & Alcock, L. (2009). Semantic and syntactic reasoning and proving in advanced 
mathematics classrooms. Invited chapter on research on proof at the undergraduate level 
for M. Blanton, D. Stylinaiou, and E. Knuth (Eds.), The teaching and learning of proof 
across the K-16 curriculum (pp. 323-338). New York: Routledge. 
Weber, K. & Mejia-Ramos, J.P. (2019). An empirical study on the admissibility of graphical 
inferences in mathematical proofs. In A. Aberdein & M. Inglis (Ed.) Advances in 
experimental philosophy of logic and mathematics (pp. 123-144). London: Bloomsbury. 
 
